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Abstract 
Against the backdrop of high expectations from the international 
community on the United Nations in the wake of the end of the Cold War 
and Super Power rivalries which had encumbered its performance over the 
years as a global institution capable of enthroning peace, this study revisits 
two episodes generally regarded as low points in the UN’s avowed peace 
purpose and efforts. Using a case study approach, the study interrogates the 
UN’s initiatives at Bosnia and Rwanda and concludes that in these instances, 
the global body failed institutionally to stop mass murders, rapes as well as 
destruction and desecration of cultural heritages. Indeed, it is argued strongly 
here that in Bosnia and Rwanda, the UN was merely, to borrow the words of 
Samantha Power,’ a bystander to genocide’. 
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Introduction 
 The United Nations (UN) proved a failure specifically on its security 
responsibility since the Balkan Wars, particularly within the period of the 
first decade of the end of the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War it was 
expected that the UN can at last act to fulfill the vision of its founders and 
become a dependable instrument for the maintenance of international peace 
and security (Feldman 1991). Indeed as stated in the preamble of its Charter, 
the UN was conceived to:  
‘save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in 
our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm 
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the 
human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations 
large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and 
respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of 
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international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress 
and better standards of life in larger freedom…’ 2 
 However, this was not to be, as the last decades of the last century 
witnessed grave carnage around the world, so that it has been labeled as the 
‘age of genocide’ (Stoett 1994). As intra-state conflicts increased, the UNs 
inability to stem destruction and colossal loss of lives affected its reputation 
and diminished public perception of its peacekeeping missions (McCarten 
2012). Considering that the UN came into being to, in the opening words of 
its Charter, ‘save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’, a security 
concern that stems from the carnage and devastation of the Second World 
War, which subsequently influenced its designers to mid-wife an 
organization that will serve as a framework for global cooperative problem 
solving with its core responsibility being, the promotion of international 
peace and security (Heywood 2011, Nye and Welch 2013), then, the picture 
we have seen for the more than half a century of its existence is that, the UN 
has struggled to meet this responsibility and challenge. It has in the process 
recorded instances of glaring failures and modest gains, a record that at best 
can be described, in terms of its overall performance, as a mixed bag of 
grave failures and commendable successes. In this short discourse, the intent 
is to draw on UN designs in terms of its purposes and principles at sustaining 
global peace and security as enunciated in Chapters I, VI and VII of its 
Charter by examining its general intervention efforts to protect the world 
against international crisis, so as to critically interrogate how it performed in 
the Balkan crisis and Rwanda. 
 
Organogram and Cold War Situation 
 Structured around six principal Organs namely; the General 
Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the 
Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat, 
the UNs main purposes and principles in summary includes: the maintenance 
of international peace and security; to develop friendly relations among 
nations; to achieve international co-operation in solving international 
problems of economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character; and, to be a 
centre for harmonizing the actions of nations to achieve these aims. 
However, for much of the period between 1945 to the end of the 1980s, the 
UN was shunted to the background, unable to function fully in accordance 
with the precepts of its Charter, as a basis for meeting these purposes and 
principles (Armstrong, Lloyd and Redmond 2004). This situation was 
fostered by the prevailing Cold War of the period which made it impossible 
to arrive at unanimity essential for the fulfillment of the objectives of the 
Charter as the Super Powers squabbled and engaged in ideological rivalries 
around the globe (Tozzi 1996). However, if the encumbrances of the Cold 
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War appeared dissipated by the early 1990s with its end, and gave a glimmer 
of hope for better things to come, this quickly faded away as what can be 
described as colossal failures of the UN with regard to its security purpose 
actually occurred in the post Cold War years, in the form of Bosnia and 
Rwanda. In this light, an apt question to ask is how did the UN fare in its 
peace and security purpose in the Balkans and Rwanda between 1991 and 
1994? This is the overarching question of this study. 
 
Post Cold War Challenges 
 The decade following the end of the cold war witnessed considerable 
turbulence around the world. There was ‘volatility and strife in the former 
Soviet bloc; ethnic and religious turmoil; humanitarian disasters and 
emergencies in developing countries where civil disorder was out of control 
and security severely lacking; and more wars and open conflicts than at any 
time in the preceding half-century, as the rigid certainties of super power 
rivalries gave way’ (Armstrong, Lloyd and Redmond 2004: 82). These 
scenarios seriously tested, and stretched the framework, capability and 
resources of the UN to its limits. Indeed the UNs well publicized failures in 
the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Somalia, have had a lasting damage on 
its reputation and credibility, and exposed its organizational inefficiencies 
which culminated in the words of (Malone and Thakur 2001) ‘in tragedies of 
avoidable errors’. 
 The Balkan Wars were provoked by the collapse of the Yugoslav 
Federation in 1991. The rump remains of that republic could not forge any 
central cohesion as the separate ethnic nationalisms of the various 
component units drifted towards self rule. Waged in the name of competing 
sovereignties, the Balkan wars, violently pitched fellow citizens against one 
another in a struggle for power and domination. In late June 1991, Serbian 
controlled Yugoslav Army troops invaded the newly declared Slovenian 
Republic signaling the disintegration of the Yugoslav Republic. 
Consequently, Slobodan Milosevic blatantly manipulated Serbian 
nationalism in order to secure a hold on power, in the process willing to 
resort to blood and iron to carve out a greater Serbia from the collapsing 
Yugoslav state (Nation 2003). By the time the destructive hostilities of the 
Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) reached Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo 
between 1992 and 1999, and later to Macedonia in 2000 to 2001, the 
conflagrations had claimed over 200,000 lives, the disappearance of 
numerous Croatian, Serbian and Muslim villages, reduced cities like 
Vukovar to rubble, throwing up millions of refugees, and generally giving 
rise to atrocities unseen in Europe since World War II, leaving behind a 
terrible legacy of physical ruin and psychological devastation (Ramet 1993, 
Nation 2003) . 
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 The high points of the Balkan Wars were the Serb inspired systemic 
ethnic cleansings fuelled by hate propaganda which led to recurrent 
massacres and widespread cultural vandalism, with the apogee being the 
events of July 11 and 25 1995 when Bosnian –Serb forces seized the UN safe 
areas of Srebrenica and Zepa. In the former, they pushed aside a small force 
of 429 Dutch UN peacekeepers and massacred over 8,000 Muslims in what 
became known as the worst single atrocity of the entire Balkan war. 
 As the Balkan Wars unfolded and became a blot in the peace and 
security mandate of the UN, the carnage pressured calls for international 
military intervention. It must be noted that for the most part before the 
genocide, diplomatic efforts aimed at stemming the crisis were premised on 
the belief that the parties would come to a round table and negotiate in good 
faith. However, according to Ramet (1993) failure of more than a dozen 
ceasefires showed how wrong that assumption was. Significantly, the UNs 
feeble response in the form of countless resolutions, embargoes, and ill-
mandated and ill-prepared peacekeepers who were sent in to keep peace 
where there was no peace to keep indicates that traditional UN peacekeeping 
proved inadequate to the demands of the conflict. In this instance, it was 
expected that enforcement measures as provided for in Chapter Seven, 
(Article 42) would have been used where preventive ones had failed, but 
unfortunately, this was not considered even when clearly civilian lives were 
at risk. Also, the Balkan episode showed a great lack of will to act decisively 
on the part of the international community. Indeed, we are informed that 
America’s belated involvement was in many ways a product of residual Cold 
War dynamics (Nation 2003). Tony Blair’s 1999 Chicago Economic Club 
Speech on Kosovo, in which he called for early and decisive international 
action, in matters of conflicts and killings is a further attestation to this fact. 
 The killings and human sufferings in the Balkans were no more or 
less atrocious and lamentable than other parallel conflicts of significant 
proportions that occurred elsewhere. According to Marrack Goulding (1999), 
a once long serving UN Under-Secretary-General, in 14 of the 25 conflicts 
that faced Africa in the years following the end of the cold war, the UN 
played a peacemaker and peacekeeper role, working with the OAU and other 
sub-regional bodies in Liberia and Sierra Leone. But in all these, the 
conflagration in Rwanda proved more daunting and testing for the UN. Here, 
the UN force (UNAMIR) sent in to help the warring parties implement the 
Arusha Agreement which provided for a ceasefire could not come to the aid 
of civilians when genocide began in April 1994, because two of the three 
main contingents were withdrawn by their governments and the force lacked 
appropriate mandate and capacity to stop the killings (Doyle and Sambanis 
2006). Months were to pass before the UN Security Council could extend a 
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new mandate and get the necessary troops, but by then, the harm of about 
800,000 dead Rwandans had been done already (Jones 2007). 
 It is instructive to note that as in the Balkans and Rwanda, the UN 
also failed in it missions in Somalia between 1992 and 1995. It’s UNOSOM 
I and II Missions made very little impact in bringing peace to this country 
and had to be withdrawn without achieving many of its objectives, key 
amongst which were to disarm the warring parties and safeguard the delivery 
of humanitarian assistance. Consequently, this failure of the UN left Somalia 
rudderless and it remained as the epitome of a failed state, essentially 
without a central government for a long time, with the attendant sufferings of 
its people who were caught in its complex and ever-changing civil war 
(Armstrong, Lloyd and Redmond 2004). 
 
Assessment 
 Though UN activities were not confined to only these three case 
studies examined above within the period under review, they represent the 
most glaring cases of UN failure in its onerous task of maintaining peace and 
bringing security to troubled spots. Its failures and successes in Cambodia, 
Sierra Leone, East Timor, Congo, and Iraq (2002-03) have been noted in the 
academic literature out there. However, with regard to the Balkans, Rwanda 
and Somalia, Goulding (1999) says UN peacekeeping is perceived to have 
failed because its forces could not succeed in preventing extreme violations 
of humanitarian rights and protect international humanitarian relief 
operations. In the same vein, Nation (2003) informs that in these cases UN 
initiatives did not provide effective tools for shaping the conflict 
environment. Instead, a lack of consensus bordering on priorities, limited 
mandates, purpose and style of such an intervention, and aversion to risk led 
to mission failures. A case in point is the instance of when only 7,000 of the 
34,000 peacekeepers pledged to defend the safe areas in the Balkan Wars 
arrived, and even though UNPROFOR forces grew from 1500 in 1992 to 
over 23,000 by 1995, they were grossly insufficient to the task at hand, and 
the mission was characterized with an ever changing mandate (Economides 
and Taylor 2007). 
 The UNs functional failures were also as a result of actions of its 
member states and its political and military personnel bordering on policy, as 
well as managerial and operational errors. For instance, it is on record that 
leading UN member states resisted deployment of peacekeeping forces into 
the Congo in 1999 until a peace accord was reached between the warring 
parties. As a consequence, many civilians died in the interim as a 
comprehensive peace agreement proved elusive (Greig and Diehl 2005). 
Again, when the Liberian crises began in 1990, leading African members of 
the UN impressed upon the then Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, 
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to do something and his reply was said to have been that ‘there was nothing 
he could do’, that as Secretary-General he was not authorized to intervene in 
domestic matters (Goulding 1999). In Bosnia, there are accounts of atrocities 
of brutal and systemic rapes, torture and killings with several women 
claiming they had been raped by UN soldiers as a condition for escape from 
Serbian-run rape/death camps (Peck 1995). The UNAMSIL force in Sierra 
Leone was not spared of its own problems, as it nearly imploded under fire 
due to not only poor planning, and other logistical issues, but was seriously 
undermined by the deputy force commander who reportedly refused to take 
direct orders from his commander. 
 In the face of recurring problems in its peacekeeping missions, the 
UN inaugurated in 1999 a self assessment process, the findings of which 
indicted it in the events leading to the genocide in Srebrenica. Similarly, 
another of its panels chaired by former Swedish Prime Minister Ingmar 
Carlsson presented a damning report on the UNs failure to prevent the 
genocide of half a million Rwandans in 1994 (Malone and Thakur 2001, also 
see UN Reports on Srebrenica and Rwanda). In addition, in a bid to forestall 
genocide and other mass atrocity crimes in future, the UN initiated in 2005 
the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (R2P) 3.  Adopted under UNSC 
Resolution 1674 of April 2006, it was designed with the notion that 
sovereignty is not a right, but a responsibility; hence, states and leaders 
cannot hide under sovereignty to commit mass crimes without incurring the 
wrath and response of the international community. R2P was applied in 
Libya under UN Security Council Resolution 1973 of 17 March 2011, where 
the UN, influenced by its institutional failures in the Balkans and Rwanda, 
did not rely on its blue helmets, but rather, collaborated with the European 
Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to prosecute and 
enforce its UNSC no fly zone resolution in that country.  
 
Successes 
 Though the primary focus of this paper is on security, it is important 
to touch on, even if lightly on other aspect where the UN recorded some 
measures of achievement considering the broad range of its activities. In this 
light, it has not been a completely negative picture for the UN. Within the 
period under review, the UN also employed its sprawling programmes, funds 
and agencies to address other issues, especially missions involving 
significant nation-building activities in addition to the traditional truce 
observation role of peacekeeping. It is recorded that the UNs international 
peace building efforts aiming to prevent violence from recurring in states just 
coming out of civil wars achieved the aim of enthroning stability in such 
states as Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Haiti, and East Timor (Paris 
2002, Lipson 2007). In these instances, the UN helped to prepare for, to 
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oversee, or to administer electoral and humanitarian activities. Indeed in 
Mozambique, the UN played a significant role in the run up to the national 
elections of October 1994. Here, the UN involved itself in the design and 
implementation of electoral laws, as well as monitoring human rights, and 
civil liberties, including freedom of the press and association (Paris 2002). It 
performed a similar role in El Salvador, after mediating an end to the civil 
war in 1991, and helped to usher in a new government through elections in 
1994. Its emergency humanitarian relief activities in Haiti and Sudan are also 
highly commendable. In all of its humanitarian operations, the cost to the UN 
in terms of personnel involved and resources amounted to by 1994 about 77, 
783 blue helmets, with an annual cost of $3.6 billion (Lipson 2007). Also, 
one area where the UN has done significantly well in post Cold War years is 
in the peaceful settlement of international disputes between states through 
adjudication. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has recorded an 
impressive compliance to its judgments by states on matters which would 
have possibly degenerated to conflict situations. This conforms with the UNs 
belief in the principles of global justice and international law as vehicles for 
resolving issues which might lead to a breach of the peace. 
 
Conclusion 
 Since the Balkan Wars the UN and humanity failed woefully 
systematically in Srebrenica, Rwanda, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Darfur, and 
Cambodia to contain bloody and costly wars among ethnic groups that 
mostly deteriorated to proportions that have not been seen since the 
holocaust of World War II. These cases are rightly seen as the lowest points 
in the UNs post-Cold War peace and security efforts, mainly because of the 
wanton and callous loss of human lives, and destruction of properties, a 
situation that has not been seen since the Second World War.  Indeed, most 
of the blame is located in the attitude of UN member states towards these 
upheavals, as well as the organization itself and its secretariat, who 
collectively when faced with the worst humanitarian catastrophes of the post-
Cold War era shirked their responsibilities by doing nothing or little until 
much too late. Even though, the UN scored some successes in its 
humanitarian efforts through its other specialized agencies over time, the 
failure to act swiftly and stop genocide in the Balkans and Rwanda has 
remained a dark spot in its post-Cold War history, it is one in which it did 
not come out unscathed, and which characterized the UN as a bystander to 
mass killings.  
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Notes 
1. Samantha Power used the term “Bystanders to Genocide” in 2001 to 
illustrate how the United States let the Rwandan tragedy happen. For 
details, see The Atlantic Monthly of September 2001. 
2. The Preamble of the United Nations Charter, 
www.un.org/en/documents/charter/preamble.shtml. 
3. At the UN World Summit in September 2005, all member states 
formally accepted the R2P Doctrine. See 
www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgresponsibility.shtm
l. 
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